Georgy Artemov, Yeon-Koo Che, YingHua He
arXiv 28 Jul 2022 · Theoretical Economics · publishedJournal of Political Economy Microeconomics (2022) · 17 citations (OpenAlex)
arXiv:2207.13939 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
Motivated by growing evidence of agents' mistakes in strategically simple environments, we propose a solution concept -- robust equilibrium -- that requires only an asymptotically optimal behavior. We use it to study large random matching markets operated by the applicant-proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA). Although truth-telling is a dominant strategy, almost all applicants may be non-truthful in robust equilibrium; however, the outcome must be arbitrarily close to the stable matching. Our results imply that one can assume truthful agents to study DA outcomes, theoretically or counterfactually. However, to estimate the preferences of mistaken agents, one should assume stable matching but not truth-telling.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Fack, Grenet, and He (2019) Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions self | 1.000 | 8 | 5 | 100% |
| 2 | Azevedo and Leshno (2016) A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets | 1.000 | 6 | 4 | 100% |
| 3 | Che and Tercieux (2019) Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 4 | Shorrer and Sóvágó (2020) Obvious Mistakes in a Strategically Simple College-Admissions Environment | 0.644 | 4 | 1 | 100% |
| 5 | Hällsten (2010) The Structure of Educational Decision Making and Consequences for Inequality: A Swedish Test Case | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 6 | Kirkeben (2012) Preferences for Lifetime Earnings, Earnings Risk and Monpecuniary Attributes in Choice of Higher Education | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 7 | Deb and Kalai (2015) Stability in Large Bayesian Games with Heterogeneous Players | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 8 | Kalai (2004) Large Robust Games | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 9 | McDiarmid (1989) On the method of bounded differences | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Roth (1982) The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 52 scored citations.
arXiv econ.EM papers that cite this one, ranked by how heavily they lean on it.