YingHua He, Shruti Sinha, Xiaoting Sun
arXiv 5 Apr 2021 · Econometrics · publishedEconometrica (2024) · 13 citations (OpenAlex)
arXiv:2104.02009 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
In a setting of many-to-one two-sided matching with non-transferable utilities, e.g., college admissions, we study conditions under which preferences of both sides are identified with data on one single market. Regardless of whether the market is centralized or decentralized, assuming that the observed matching is stable, we show nonparametric identification of preferences of both sides under certain exclusion restrictions. To take our results to the data, we use Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate different estimators, including the ones that are directly constructed from the identification. We find that a parametric Bayesian approach with a Gibbs sampler works well in realistically sized problems. Finally, we illustrate our methodology in decentralized admissions to public and private schools in Chile and conduct a counterfactual analysis of an affirmative action policy.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Azevedo, E. M. and J. D. Leshno (2016) A supply and demand framework for two-sided matching markets | 0.874 | 5 | 2 | 100% |
| 2 | Fack, G., J. Grenet, and Y. He (2019) Beyond Truth-Telling: Preference Estimation with Centralized School Choice and College Admissions | 0.874 | 5 | 2 | 100% |
| 3 | Agarwal, N (2015) An Empirical Model of the Medical Match | 0.737 | 4 | 2 | 75% |
| 4 | Abdulkadiro glu, A., N. Agarwal, and P. A. Pathak (2017) The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 5 | Gazmuri, A (2017) School Segregation in the Presence of Student Sorting and Cream-Skimming | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 6 | Diamond, W. and N. Agarwal (2017) Latent indices in assortative matching models | 0.644 | 4 | 1 | 100% |
| 7 | Artemov, G., Y.-K. Che, and Y. He (2020) Strategic `Mistakes': Implications for Market Design Research, Manuscript | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 8 | Agarwal, N. and P. Somaini (2022) Demand Analysis under Latent Choice Constraints, Tech | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 9 | Kapor, A. J., C. A. Neilson, and S. D. Zimmerman (2020) Heterogeneous beliefs and school choice mechanisms | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Roth, A. E. and M. Sotomayor (1992) Two-sided matching | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 56 scored citations.
arXiv econ.EM papers that cite this one, ranked by how heavily they lean on it.
| Citing paper | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Social Interactions in Endogenous Groups | 1.000 | 10 | 6 |
| 2 | 2101.00399 | 0.585 | 3 | 1 |
| 3 | Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents | 0.405 | 1 | 1 |
| 4 | Exogenous Consideration and Extended Random Utility | 0.405 | 1 | 1 |