Irene Aldridge
arXiv 27 Sep 2026 · Econometrics
arXiv:2609.33058 · PDF · Extracted main text
Market microstructure studies how trading rules turn orders into prices and allocations. Those rules have been rebuilt repeatedly: for floor traders, electronic limit order books and high-frequency trading, batch auctions and dark pools, blockchains run by automated market makers and block builders, and now AI agents that discover, pay for, and compete over resources. This survey traces that evolution through one question: can a market allocate scarce goods efficiently and fairly without participants revealing everything they know and want? Each technological shift moved the binding constraint of market design from trader rationality to speed, to control over transaction ordering, to the dimensionality of what participants can report. Impossibility results persist; only their cost moves. We review evidence on high-frequency trading, trading venues, automated market makers, extractable value and algorithmic collusion, and identify allocation as the missing layer of the agent-commerce protocol stack.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Aldridge, Irene (2026) Comparing Market Mechanism Efficiencies self | 1.000 | 9 | 4 | 100% |
| 2 | Budish, Eric and Cramton, Peter and Shim, John (2015) The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response | 1.000 | 7 | 3 | 100% |
| 3 | Myerson, Roger B. and Satterthwaite, Mark A (1983) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading | 0.928 | 4 | 3 | 100% |
| 4 | Zhu, Shenzhe and Sun, Jiao and Nian, Yi and South, Tobin and Pentlan… (2025) The Automated but Risky Game: Modeling Agent-to-Agent Negotiations and Transactions in Consumer Markets | 0.928 | 4 | 3 | 100% |
| 5 | Aldridge, Irene (2026) Multi-Dimensional Matching self | 0.874 | 12 | 2 | 100% |
| 6 | Aldridge, Irene (2025) Crypto: Literature Review, Best Practices and Microstructure self | 0.874 | 6 | 2 | 100% |
| 7 | Gode, Dhananjay K. and Sunder, Shyam (1993) Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality | 0.843 | 3 | 3 | 100% |
| 8 | Anthropic (2024) Model Context Protocol Specification | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 9 | Coinbase Developer Platform (2025) Introducing x402: A New Standard for Internet-Native Payments | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Daian, Philip and Goldfeder, Steven and Kell, Tyler and Li, Yunqi an… (2020) Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning in Decentralized Exchanges, Miner Extractable Value, and Consensus Instability | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 107 scored citations.