Irene Aldridge
arXiv 24 Sep 2026 · Econometrics
arXiv:2609.29958 · PDF · Extracted main text
We study a matching mechanism where agents and objects are described by features rather than complete rankings. A single spectral projection reduces the problem to a one-dimensional sort, computable in O(N log N) time. We prove that on descaled features and preferences, our algorithm obtains the exact Nash Social Welfare (NSW) optimum within the projected space, with an unconditional utilitarian-welfare guarantee and a conditional NSW guarantee. The proposed mechanism is stable against exogenous noise but not strategy-proof; we provide an explicit profitable misreport. On an agentic AI shopping application, the diagnostics correctly anticipate both a success and a failure case. A 100-instance robustness study confirms the findings.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Chawla, Shuchi and Hartline, Jason D. and Malec, David L. and Sivan,… (2010) Multi-Parameter Mechanism Design and Sequential Posted Pricing | 0.928 | 4 | 3 | 100% |
| 2 | Cole, Richard and Gkatzelis, Vasilis (2018) Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items | 0.843 | 3 | 3 | 100% |
| 3 | Zhou, Lin (1990) On a Conjecture by Gale about One-Sided Matching Problems | 0.843 | 3 | 3 | 100% |
| 4 | Abebe, Rediet and Cole, Richard and Gkatzelis, Vasilis and Hartline,… (2020) A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching | 0.811 | 4 | 2 | 100% |
| 5 | Devanur, Nikhil R. and Hartline, Jason D. and Yan, Qiqi (2015) Envy Freedom and Prior-Free Mechanism Design | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 6 | Hylland, Aanund and Zeckhauser, Richard (1979) The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 7 | Abdulkadiro glu, Atila and Sönmez, Tayfun (1998) Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 8 | Eckart, Carl and Young, Gale (1936) The Approximation of One Matrix by Another of Lower Rank | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 9 | Gale, D. and Shapley, L. S (1962) College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Golub, G. H. and Reinsch, C (1970) Singular Value Decomposition and Least Squares Solutions | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 45 scored citations.