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Set Identification in Models with Multiple Equilibria

Alfred Galichon, Marc Henry

arXiv 24 Feb 2021 · Econometrics

arXiv:2102.12249 · PDF · Extracted main text

Abstract

We propose a computationally feasible way of deriving the identified features of models with multiple equilibria in pure or mixed strategies. It is shown that in the case of Shapley regular normal form games, the identified set is characterized by the inclusion of the true data distribution within the core of a Choquet capacity, which is interpreted as the generalized likelihood of the model. In turn, this inclusion is characterized by a finite set of inequalities and efficient and easily implementable combinatorial methods are described to check them. In all normal form games, the identified set is characterized in terms of the value of a submodular or convex optimization program. Efficient algorithms are then given and compared to check inclusion of a parameter in this identified set. The latter are illustrated with family bargaining games and oligopoly entry games.

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51
references
107
in-text mentions
51
distinct cited
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self-citations
19,100
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Most heavily cited references

The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.

ReferenceIntensityMentionsSectionsMain text
1Berry, Steve, Tamer, Elie (2006) Identification in models of oligopoly entry1.000104100%
2Galichon, Alfred, Henry, Marc (2006) Inference in incomplete models self1.00095100%
3Engers, Maxim, Stern, Steven (2002) Family Bargaining and Long Term Care1.00083100%
4Fujishige, Satoru (2005) Submodular Functions and Optimization0.92844100%
5Galichon, Alfred, Henry, Marc (2007) A test of non-identifying restrictions and confidence regions for partially identified parameters self0.92844100%
6Andrews, Donald, Berry, Steven, Jia, Panle (2003) Placing bounds on parameters of entry games in the presence of multiple equilibria0.92843100%
7Jovanovic, Boyan (1989) Observable implications of models with multiple equilibria0.87452100%
8Shapley, Lloyd S (1971) Cores of convex games0.84333100%
9Ciliberto, Federico, Tamer, Elie (2006) Market structure and multiple equilibria in airline markets0.81142100%
10Beresteanu, Arie, Molchanov, Ilya, Molinari, Francesca (2009) Sharp Identification Regions in Models with Convex Predictions: Games, Individual Choice, and Incomplete Data0.73732100%

Showing the top 10 of 51 scored citations.

Cited by, within the corpus

arXiv econ.EM papers that cite this one, ranked by how heavily they lean on it.

Citing paperIntensityMentionsSections
1Estimating Discrete Games of Complete Information: Bringing Logit Back in the Game1.000133
2Robust Likelihood Ratio Tests for Incomplete Economic Models1.00083
3Inference on Causal and Structural Parameters using Many Moment Inequalities1.00063
4Sharp bounds and testability of a Roy model of STEM major choices1.00054
5Dilation Bootstrap1.00055
6Partial Identification in Nonseparable Binary Response Models with Endogenous Regressors We are grateful to James Heckman, Marc Henry, Roger Koenker, and to seminar audiences at Columbia University and Michigan State University for helpful feedback. We also thank Martin Weidner and the organizers of the Chamberlain Seminar, and are grateful to Florian Gunsilius, Sukjin Han, Wayne Gao, and Takuya Ura for their questions and feedback, and to Adam Rosen for his thoughtful discussion. Jiaying Gu acknowledges financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. All errors are our own0.92843
7Robust Tests of Model Incompleteness in the Presence of Nuisance Parameters0.84343
8Policy Transforms and Learning Optimal Policies I thank Jiaying Gu, Ismael Mourifie, Eduardo Souza-Rodrigues, Adam Rosen, Stanislav Volgushev and Yuanyuan Wan for their feedback and encouragement, and I am especially grateful to JoonHwan Cho for many hours of discussion that helped to improve this paper. A previous version of this paper appeared in my doctoral thesis at the University of Toronto. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. All errors are my own0.81142
9Generalized Optimal Transport0.81142
10Discerning Solution Concepts0.73732