arXiv 20 Sep 2019 · Econometrics
arXiv:1909.09320 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
The empirical analysis of discrete complete-information games has relied on behavioral restrictions in the form of solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium. Choosing the right solution concept is crucial not just for identification of payoff parameters, but also for the validity and informativeness of counterfactual exercises and policy implications. We say that a solution concept is discernible if it is possible to determine whether it generated the observed data on the players' behavior and covariates. We propose a set of conditions that make it possible to discern solution concepts. In particular, our conditions are sufficient to tell whether the players' choices emerged from Nash equilibria. We can also discern between rationalizable behavior, maxmin behavior, and collusive behavior. Finally, we identify the correlation structure of unobserved shocks in our model using a novel approach.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Beresteanu, A., Molchanov, I., and Molinari, F (2011) Sharp identification regions in models with convex moment predictions | 1.000 | 6 | 3 | 100% |
| 2 | Bresnahan, T. F. and Reiss, P. C (1990) Entry in monopoly market | 0.928 | 4 | 3 | 100% |
| 3 | Bajari, P., Hong, H., and Ryan, S. P (2010) Identification and estimation of a discrete game of complete information | 0.874 | 5 | 2 | 100% |
| 4 | Kline, B (2015) Identification of complete information games | 0.843 | 3 | 3 | 100% |
| 5 | Galichon, A. and Henry, M (2011) Set identification in models with multiple equilibria | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 6 | Tamer, E (2003) Incomplete simultaneous discrete response model with multiple equilibria | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 7 | Aradillas-López, A. and Tamer, E (2008) The identification power of equilibrium in simple games | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 8 | Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D (1989) Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 9 | Brown, L. D (1986) Fundamentals of statistical exponential families with applications in statistical decision theory, volume 9 of Lecture notes – M… | 0.511 | 2 | 2 | 50% |
| 10 | Goolsbee, A (2002) Subsidies, the value of broadband, and the importance of fixed costs | 0.511 | 2 | 2 | 50% |
Showing the top 10 of 35 scored citations.