arXiv 12 Jul 2018 · Econometrics
arXiv:1807.04621 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
I present a dynamic, voluntary contribution mechanism, public good game and derive its potential outcomes. In each period, players endogenously determine contribution productivity by engaging in costly investment. The level of contribution productivity carries from period to period, creating a dynamic link between periods. The investment mimics investing in the stock of technology for producing public goods such as national defense or a clean environment. After investing, players decide how much of their remaining money to contribute to provision of the public good, as in traditional public good games. I analyze three kinds of outcomes of the game: the lowest payoff outcome, the Nash Equilibria, and socially optimal behavior. In the lowest payoff outcome, all players receive payoffs of zero. Nash Equilibrium occurs when players invest any amount and contribute all or nothing depending on the contribution productivity. Therefore, there are infinitely many Nash Equilibria strategies. Finally, the socially optimal result occurs when players invest everything in early periods, then at some point switch to contributing everything. My goal is to discover and explain this point. I use mathematical analysis and computer simulation to derive the results.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ngo, J. and Smith, A (2020) A public good game with technological growth | 1.000 | 6 | 4 | 100% |
| 2 | Marwell, G. and Ames, R.E (1981) Economists free ride, does anyone else?: Experiments on the provision of public goods, iv | 0.585 | 3 | 1 | 100% |
| 3 | Isaac, R.M., Walker, J.M., and Thomas, S.H (1984) Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 4 | Gibbons, R (1997) An introduction to applicable game theory | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 5 | Kagel, J.H., Roth, A.E., and Ledyard, J.O (1995) Public Goods: A Survey on Experimental Research | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 6 | Chaudhuri, A (2011) Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 7 | Bogatov, D (2017) Analysis of a dynamic voluntary contribution mechanism public good game self | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 8 | Isaac, R.M. and Walker, J.M (1988) Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 9 | Nash, J (1951) Non-cooperative games | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
Showing the top 9 of 9 scored citations.