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Dynamic Decision-Making under Model Misspecification
Keywords: Thompson Sampling, Model Misspecification, Dynamic Decision-Making, Pseudo-Truth Parameter
Dynamic decision-making problems arise in many economic contexts, such as dynamic pricing, online advertising, investment, and treatment allocation. In these contexts, the decision maker needs to learn the true model from the data and make decisions based on the learned model. This generates a well-known exploration-exploitation trade-off (lattimore2020bandit). Traditional methods such as Thompson Sampling (TS) are used for solving these dynamic problems are proved to be asymptotically optimal. However, these results contains implicit assumption that the underlying model is correctly specified and there is limited understanding how those methods behave for a possibly misspecified class of models.
On the other hand, econometricians have investigated model misspecification for a long time. It is well-known that the statistical inference under misspecification will lead to a pseudo-true parameter, which minimizes the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the true model and the pseudo-true model (white1982maximum). Recent research in bayesian decision theory characterize conditions for priors which lead to a unique and informative pseudo-truth convergence (andrews2023structural). However, it is still unclear how misspecification affects the behavior of parameter estimation in a dynamic environment.\footnote{There are also other recent research on the diagnosis and inference under, either local or global, model misspecification, such as mullerlocally, bonhomme2022minimizing armstrong2024adapting, and masten2021salvaging. However, all of those research mainly focus on the static case.}
In this paper, we address these challenges by providing a preliminary analysis of Thompson Sampling under model misspecification. Our main contribution was to show that, even when the true data-generating mechanism \(\theta^{*}\) lies outside the assumed parameter space \(\Theta\), Thompson Sampling algorithm still produces posterior distributions that concentrate around a pseudo-truth set \(\Theta^\dagger\) at an exponential rate. This result holds irrespective of which actions are chosen, provided the algorithm uses Bayesian updates to compare parameters' likelihood scores. Moreover, the total regret grows linearly in time \(T\), implying a constant per-period regret in the limit. Then we further derived necessary conditions under which pathwise posterior concentration on a subset of \(\Theta^\dagger\) can occur. Specifically, a subset \(S\subset \Theta^\dagger\) must be jointly closed under overshadowing and strongly connected to sustain nontrivial posterior mass in the long run.
We also performed simulations for further investigate the behavior of the parameter posterior within the psuedo-truth set. Our simulations are based on two distinct true data-generating processes (DGPs): a quadratic reward function with thresholds and a piecewise linear reward function with breakpoints. The simulation results shows that the MAP of the parameter is no longer convergnce to a single point and multiple limits can coexist. The average regret of the Thompson Sampling algorithm remains bounded by a constant, and it also shows robustness to the correctly specified case. These findings suggest opportunities to design simple yet robust algorithms that can be adaptive to model misspecifications.
\paragraph{Literature Review} The literature on dynamic decision-making under model misspecification is still limited. Several current research on this topic is done by adusumilli2021risk and fan2021diffusion, who use the stochastic differential equation to approximate asymptotic behavior of Thompson Sampling algorithm under the bandit problem. Certain types of misspecification are considered in fan2021diffusion,li2023dynamicselectionalgorithmicdecisionmaking's work such as the misspecification of the variance of the noise distribution or the endogeneity between the choices of arm and its contextual variables. However, this paper's contribution distinguishes from these research in three folds. First, we investigate a more flexible setting of misspecification of reward functions and this will plays a key role in our analysis of the algoirthms dynamics. Second, our setting is adapt to continuous bandit problem with a parametric setting rather than a fully nonparametric discrete bandit problem, which could be more attractive to applied economists, who may hold certain prior knowledge of the reward function implied from the economic theory. Third, as far as we know, our investigation on misspecified dynamics decision making from the pseudo truth parameter perspective is novel to the literature. \footnote{Moreover, misspecified bandit problem is also considered in the reinforcement learning literature. Some representative works are pmlr-v119-lattimore20a,NEURIPS2021_177db6ac,NEURIPS2020_84c230a5. However, most of those works restrict their attention to a fully nonparametric discrete bandit problem and focus on the regret rate analysis instead of the behavior of a misspecified model parameter.}
Our paper can also be related to the economic theory literature of misspecified learning. Economists have long been interested in the impact of model misspecification on the behavior of agents (https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA12609,fudenberg2023misspecifications,ba2023robustmisspecifiedmodelsparadigm). Though we share some similarity in terms of the misspecification setting, those research mainly assume the agent will take an ad hoc decision rule in a specific generic of economic context, such as dynamic game or macroeconomic model (ESPONDA2021105260,murooka2023higher). The analysis are interested in the economic insights can be generated from that context accordingly. In contrast, our paper focus more on parameter inference from a sophisticated statistician perspective, with purpose on how the pseudo-truth parameter can be characterized and how the algorithm can be designed to be robust to the misspecification. In that sense, our work rich the current economic theory considering the player as statisticians by taking the misspecification in to account (liang2019games,salant2020statistical). (may need to be more specific)
In the following sections, we will investigate the impact of model misspecification on the decision-making process through simulation results. We will compare the performance of Thompson Sampling under different levels of model misspecification, as well as different levels of noise in the rewards.
We consider a dynamic decision problem taking place over discrete time steps \(t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots\). At each time \(t\):
Here, \(\Theta\) is a finite set of candidate parameters. However, the true parameter governing the rewards, denoted \(\theta^*\), may lie outside \(\Theta\). Formally:
Expected Reward. For each \(\theta \in \Theta\), define the expected reward under that parameter as
If \(\theta\) were known and correct, the optimal action at \((a,x)\) would be \(\arg\max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} r_{\theta}(a,x)\).
Policies and Regret. A decision rule or policy \(\mu\) is a mapping from histories \(\mathcal{H}_t\) to an action in \(\mathcal{A}\). Suppose an oracle policy \(\mu_{\theta}\) that always uses the parameter \(\theta\) to select the best action. Its expected reward from time \(0\) to \(T-1\) is $$ \mathbb{E}_\theta^{\mu_{\theta}}\Bigl[\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} r_{\theta}(A_t, X_t)\Bigr] $$ A policy \(\mu\) that must learn from data could yield a (possibly lower) total expected reward, $$ \mathbb{E}_\theta^{\mu}\Bigl[\sum_{t=0}^{T-1} r_{\theta}(A_t, X_t)\Bigr] $$ We define the average expected regret of \(\mu\) over \(T\) periods as
Posterior Updating. Given a prior distribution \(\pi_0(\theta)\) over \(\Theta\), the posterior after observing history \(H_t\) is
where \(\mathcal{L}_\theta(H_t)\) is the likelihood of observing \(H_t\) under \(f_{\theta}\).
Thompson Sampling (TS). A well-known Bayesian learning algorithm for exploration–exploitation is Thompson Sampling, which proceeds as follows:
Kullback-Leibler (KL) Divergence. For two probability measures \(v_{\theta}\) and \(v_{\gamma}\), we define their KL divergence as
This will be useful for analyzing how quickly the posterior discards parameters that fit the data poorly.
We firstly consider a simple example where the decision maker will assume their reward function will come from a class of quadratic function with a Gaussian noise. It can be parameterized as follows:
where $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ is the noise term, The parameter space is defined as $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3) \in \Theta$. \footnote{Since we currently focus on the misspecification of expected reward function, we assume the variance of the noise term is known for simplicity.} This model can be used to represent a wide range of economic problems, such as dynamic pricing, investment, and treatment allocation. For example, in a dynamic pricing problem, such a quadratic reward function can be interpreted as the revenue generated by setting a price $A_t$ at time $t$, which is solved from a linear demand and supply system. The decision maker aims to learn the true parameter $\theta^*$ and make decisions that maximize the expected reward.
In such a setting, the oracle decision rule should be $\mu(t) = \mu* = -\frac{\theta_2}{2\theta_1}$ if we know the true parameter. However, when the parameter is unknown, a classical solution is using a heuristic algoirthms to balance the exploration and exploitation trade off. For example, Thompson Sampling algorithm is a Bayesian algorithm that samples the parameter from the posterior distribution and selects the action that maximizes the expected reward. The specific implementation of the Thompson Sampling algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
The posterior distribution of the parameter $\theta$ at time $t$ is given by (ref).
The existing research has shown the Thompson Sampling algorithm can achieve an $O(e^{-T})$ rate of convergence of the posterior parameter to the true parameter under the correctly specified model (kim2017thompson,banjevic2019thompson) and the expectation of parameter posterior will converge to the true parameter with exponential rate.
Now let us consider two examples of misspeciication on the above quadratic expected reward function's underlying assumptions. The first is the symmetry of the reward function (Example 1) and the second is unimodal of the reward function (Example 2). Those assumptions are generally not true when the demand function is nonlinear. In the following simulations, we will investigate how the Thompson Sampling algorithm behaves under these two types of model misspecification.
True DGP Example 1:
Let $\{\epsilon_t\}_{t \geq 1}$ be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables such that $\epsilon_t \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$. The parameter space is given by
True DGP Example 2:
where $\epsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ is the noise term. The parameter space is defined as:
Figure (ref) shows under model misspecification, the Thompson Sampling algorithm will assign less probability to the true parameter and more probability to 'pseudo-true' parameters. Moreover, the simulation results show that the MAP of the parameter is no longer convergnce to a single point and multiple limits can coexist (Figure (ref))\footnote{The results from misspecified model in Example 1 is similar to Example 2 but are not shown here, because the correct specified model uses different class of parameters, which are not directly comparable.}. In such cases, the pseudo-true parameter is not even well-defined. And since the bias of the parameter estimation persists, the decision rule will be suboptimal. This results in a constant average regret (or linear accumulative regret) rate rather than an exponential convergence rate for the Thompson Sampling algorithm (see in Figure (ref) and Figure (ref)).
Now I want to show the first main result of this paper, that is given the model misspecification, the posterior distribution of the parameter will concentrate around a pseudo-true parameter set $\Theta^\dagger$.
Assumption 2 (psuedo-truth set): There exist a subset $\Theta^{\dagger} \subset \mathcal{P}$, for any $\theta$ not in $\Theta^{\dagger}$, the following inequality holds:
for some positive $\epsilon(\theta)$.
The intuition behind this assumption is said to be that the pseudo-truth set $\Theta^{\dagger}$ is the set of parameters such that it can not be uniformly dominated by any other parameter in the parameter space $\mathcal{P}$ in terms of the KL divergence. In other words, for any parameter which is not in the pseudo-truth set, there exists a positive gap between the KL divergence of a certain parameter and the true parameter for any action and covariate distribution.
The result above shows that the posterior distribution of the parameter will concentrate exponentially around the pseudo-true parameter set $\Theta^{\dagger}$. This is a generalization of the pseudo-truth parameter of white1982maximum to the dynamic decision-making problem. The intuition behind this result is that the pseudo-truth set $\Theta^{\dagger}$ is the set of parameters that cannot be uniformly dominated by any other parameter in the parameter space $\mathcal{P}$ in terms of the KL divergence. And since this results are independent of the action distribution, the algoritham such as Thompson Sampling will gradually assign less probability to the parameters that are not in the pseudo-truth set $\Theta^{\dagger}$.
Moreover, we can also get a bound on the average regret of the Thompson Sampling algorithm. Corollary 1 Suppose Assumption 1-2 holds, then Thompson Sampling $\tau$ average per-period regret is bounded by an absolute constant $C_{\Theta^{\dagger}}$:
It is not obvious that if the pseudo-truth set is tight enough. One may be more interested in characterizing the behavior of the parameter posterior within the pseudo-truth set. Intuitively, since the distribution of the action is endogenous to the algorithm itself, this recursive decision rule may depends on the specific functional form of the expeted rewards. In the following section, we will try to give several necessary conditions of the further convergence within the pseudo-truth set.
Proposition 1 gives a benchmark result of the convergence of the parameter posterior under model misspecification. It shows that the exponential convergence rate attributes can still be guaranteed the periphery of pseudo-truth set $\Theta^\dagger$.
However, one more interesting question will be how the parameter posterior behaves within the pseudo-truth set. To address this question, we can characterize the process as a dynamic system and apply stochastic approximation techniques. Before we move on to the formal analysis, let us first characterize the necessary conditions for the convergence of the parameter posterior within the pseudo-truth set.
In this section, we investigate under what conditions the posterior distribution $\pi_t(\theta)$ can concentrate on a particular parameter or subset of parameters in the pseudo-truth set $\Theta^\dagger$.
It is possible, however, that no single parameter will achieve this limit. Thuse we give the following second definition.
Recall from the proof of Proposition 1, we can rewrite the posterior on $\theta$ as:
If we assume uniform prior then we can ignore the constant term $c_\gamma$.
Let $\Theta$ be a finite parameter space, and let $\mathcal{A}$ be the action space. Suppose each parameter $\theta \in \Theta$ induces a reward model $f_{\theta}(a)$, and define \footnote{Please note here the $\phi$ is different from the decision rule $\mu$ in the Thompson Sampling algorithm. The former is just a mapping from the parameter space to the action space, while the latter is a mapping from the history to the action space. However, when the true parameter is known, the decision rule $\mu$ will gives actions coincides with the mapping $\phi$ for every period.} $$ \phi: \Theta \;\to\; \mathcal{A}^{\circ} \;\subseteq\; \mathcal{A}, \quad \phi(\theta) \;=\;\arg\max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} f_{\theta}(a) $$ Here, $\mathcal{A}^{\circ} \subseteq \mathcal{A}$ denotes the finite set of all actions that can be the $\arg\max$ of $f_{\theta}$ for some $\theta \in \Theta$.
Now we can state the necessary condition for the individual concentration of the parameter posterior.
If the according $\Theta(1)$ is a singleton set, then the equilibrium condition is also sufficient. However, unfortunately, this is usually not the case when the the parameter space has higher dimension than the action space. For instance, in our example 2, we can find infinite parameter vector such that the function $f_\theta$ goes through a fixed point $(a, r)$ on the $\mathbb{R}^2$ plane. In general, the collective posterior concentration is a more common outcome than the individual concentration.
The collective posterior concentration can happen in quite different ways. For example, it could be the case that multiple single parameters can be concentrated by the posterior distribution separately (Figure (ref)). In that case all those parameters satisfies the necessary condition for individual concentration. It could also be the case that the posterior distribution concentrates on a subset of parameters (Figure (ref)). Then the parameter sample from the posterior distribution will cycle among the subset of parameters.
If the different patterns like in Figure (ref) and Figure (ref) can coexist, then at the expectation level, then we can only guarantee the expected posterior distribution will concentrate on a the union of all those possible parameters (parameter 1-5 in Figure (ref) should be all included).
If $\theta \to \gamma$ in this sense, then whenever the algorithm samples action $\phi(\theta)$ infinitely often while $\theta$ has nonnegligible mass, the ratio $\pi_t(\gamma)/\pi_t(\theta)$ typically grows unbounded, so $\theta$ is eventually “ruled out” by $\gamma$. By contrast, if the sampling or posterior updates switch away from $\phi(\theta)$ too soon, $\theta$ might never be fully overshadowed in practice.
We now view $\Theta$ as the vertex set of a directed graph $G=(\Theta,E)$ whose edges are precisely the overshadowing edges $\theta \to \gamma$. A subset of parameters $S\subseteq\Theta$ induces a subgraph $G[S]$.
As discussed, a bandit or Bayesian‐learning process can concentrate its posterior on a subset of parameters $S \subseteq \Theta$ along a given sample path (pathwise), but there may be multiple such subsets that arise on different sample paths due to stochasticity in rewards. Hence, while we might establish conditions under which some run converges to $S$, the expected posterior across all runs could still be split among multiple such sets.
The next proposition provides a necessary condition for this pathwise collective concentration, that is $S$ must form a jointly closed and strongly connected component in a suitable overshadowing graph. We will then show how the expected posterior might combine these different pathwise attractors.
In this paper, we examined the behavior of dynamic decision-making algorithms under model misspecification in a finite-parameter setting. Our main contributions include: First, we introduced an extension of White's (1982) pseudo-true parameter concept for the dynamic case. Instead of a single pseudo-true point, we obtained a pseudo-truth set \(\Theta^\dagger \subseteq \Theta\) whose elements provide equally good fits in terms of KL divergence. Second, we established that Thompson Sampling allocates posterior probability to parameters in \(\Theta^\dagger\) at an exponential rate. Moreover, the total regret grows linearly in time \(T\), implying a constant per-period regret in the limit. Third, within \(\Theta^\dagger\), multiple parameters may remain positive expeceted posterior forever, and the posterior can exhibit cyclic behavior among them. We derived necessary conditions under which pathwise posterior concentration on a subset of \(\Theta^\dagger\) can occur. Specifically, a subset \(S\subset \Theta^\dagger\) must be jointly closed under overshadowing and strongly connected to sustain nontrivial posterior mass in the long run. Finaly, our findings suggest that while exact parameter inference can fail under misspecification, but the simulation results shows Thompson Sampling can still yield robust action-selection performance. This suggests there may be structural conditions under which a Bayesian updating scheme remains near-optimal even when the assumed model is somewhat misspecified.
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