EconBase
← All papers

What Variation Identifies Payoffs in a Dynamic Game?

Haojie Liu, Zihan Lin

arXiv 12 Sep 2026 · Econometrics

arXiv:2609.14069 · PDF · Extracted main text

Abstract

Observed choice in a dynamic game mixes current profit with continuation value. A rival adds a second problem: the same comparison averages over the rival's equilibrium policy. Changing the primitive transition rewrites continuation technology; changing the rival's Markov policy, holding that law fixed, rewrites the mixture over rival-contingent payoffs. The two are not substitutes. For a rival-feature payoff of rank $K$, rank identification up to location requires $\Ephi=\lceil(MK-1)/(M-1)\rceil$ policy environments, and a second kernel when payoffs are saturated. Rank can still be restored by arbitrarily small policy differences. Independent private shocks force mixed rival actions to factor, so a payoff that depends jointly on $d$ rivals is visible only at order $η^{d}$ near a common interior baseline. Either rank fails or the smallest identified singular value is at most $κη^{\dPhi}$, independently of how many kernels are stacked. Oracle-GLS variance in that direction vanishes only if $nη^{2\dPhi}$ diverges. An Anderson--Rubin set that carries first-stage error in the design matrix covers without a vanishing-risk condition. On U.S.\ airline entry, even among rank-identified directions, the most favorable rival-dependent contrast is several times wider than observed behavior.

Citation extraction

34
references
37
in-text mentions
34
distinct cited
0
self-citations
13,088
main-text words

appendix boundary found by appendix_command · 46% of the source is main text. Read the extracted text to check this.

Most heavily cited references

The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.

ReferenceIntensityMentionsSectionsMain text
1Andrews, Donald W. K. and Guggenberger, Patrik (2017) Asymptotic Size of Kleibergen's LM and Conditional LR Tests for Moment Condition Models0.64422100%
2Andrews, Donald W. K. and Guggenberger, Patrik (2019) Identification- and Singularity-Robust Inference for Moment Condition Models0.64422100%
3U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2014) T-100 Domestic Segment (U.S. Carriers)0.5112250%
4Aguirregabiria, Victor and Magesan, Arvind (2020) Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games When Players' Beliefs Are Not in Equilibrium0.40511100%
5Aguirregabiria, Victor and Mira, Pedro (2007) Sequential Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Games0.40511100%
6Aguirregabiria, Victor and Suzuki, Junichi (2014) Identification and Counterfactuals in Dynamic Models of Market Entry and Exit0.40511100%
7Amin, Kareem and Singh, Satinder (2016) Towards Resolving Unidentifiability in Inverse Reinforcement Learning0.40511100%
8Anderson, T. W. and Rubin, Herman (1949) Estimation of the Parameters of a Single Equation in a Complete System of Stochastic Equations0.40511100%
9Bajari, Patrick and Benkard, C. Lanier and Levin, Jonathan (2007) Estimating Dynamic Models of Imperfect Competition0.40511100%
10Cao, Haoyang and Cohen, Samuel N. and Szpruch, Łukasz (2021) Identifiability in Inverse Reinforcement Learning0.40511100%

Showing the top 10 of 34 scored citations.