Animesh Ray
arXiv 27 Jul 2026 · physics.soc-ph
Economic stability and progress in modern technological societies depend on vigorous and independent public funding of science and engineering research. When peer review or funding decisions are perceived as politically directed, scientists, funding agencies, and the public react in coupled and conflicting ways. We an evolutionary game-theoretic model to analyze how perceived political interference in science funding affects the interrelated behaviors of scientists, funding agencies, and the public. The model simulates scientists choosing to refuse peer reviews and retaliate, agencies responding by adopting AI-assisted review and altering reviewer pay, and the public accepting or rejecting these AI systems. Through numerical simulations, five principal findings are identified: (1) Operational capacity and institutional legitimacy are governed by separate conditions and can fail independently. (2) Legitimacy of the process is bistable, meaning final states are determined by the public's acceptance of AI. (3) Since the career cost for researchers refusing to review is generally low, resistance/retaliation cascades can readily ignite, leading identical institutions to entirely opposite fates. (4) Increasing reviewer pay only stabilizes participation within a strict budget-solvency frontier, and emergency pay can paradoxically erode the legitimacy it aims to protect. (5) Finally, finite-population simulations reveal that baseline scenarios partition into either legitimacy recovery without capacity or joint failure, confirming that the fundamental separation of capacity and legitimacy outcomes is a dominant structural feature driven primarily by initial scientific resistance and politicization levels. This theoretical work quantifies issues for future work in science policy.