Matthew J. Baker, Khaled Eltokhy, Weichao Guo
arXiv 6 Jul 2026 · Econometrics
arXiv:2607.05534 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
Global games theory provides a tractable framework for analyzing coordination problems with multiple equilibria, with regime overthrow serving as a canonical application. A large empirical literature on coups d'état examines the relationship between country-level characteristics, coup occurrence, and coup success using reduced-form approaches that leave the underlying coordination problem implicit. Bridging these literatures, we develop an estimable global games model of coups d'état. The model incorporates strategic coordination into the empirical analysis of coups, employing the global games framework as an equilibrium selection device. The model distinguishes between the feasibility and desirability of regime overthrow, allowing observable fundamentals to enter separately into beliefs about regime strength and perceived gains from rebellion. The model therefore provides a theoretical basis for decomposing coup outcomes into feasibility and desirability components under maintained exclusion restrictions and equilibrium assumptions. If information on coup strength is available, the model also allows estimation of agents' uncertainty about regime strength. We show how the model can be estimated using simulated maximum likelihood coupled with a contraction mapping, and demonstrate how observable covariates map into regime strength and the perceived benefits of overthrow. We illustrate how the framework can be applied through counterfactuals varying coup benefits, regime strength, and information quality.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Morris, Stephen and Shin, Hyun Song Global Games: Theory and Applications | 1.000 | 12 | 3 | 100% |
| 2 | George-Marios Angeletos and Christian Hellwig and Alessandro Pavan Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks | 1.000 | 7 | 4 | 100% |
| 3 | Chris Edmond (2013) Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change | 0.928 | 4 | 4 | 100% |
| 4 | Jonathan M. Powell (2012) Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'État | 0.843 | 3 | 3 | 100% |
| 5 | Jonathan Powell and Clayton L. Thyne (2011) Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 6 | Carlsson, Hans and van Damme, Eric (1993) Global Games and Equilibrium Selection | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 7 | Bajari, Patrick and Hong, Han and Nekipelov, Denis (2013) Game Theory and Econometrics: A Survey of Some Recent Research | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 8 | Martin Gassebner and Jerg Gutmann and Stefan Voigt (2016) When to Expect a Coup d'Etat? An Extreme Bounds Analysis of Coup Determinants | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 9 | Quinlivan, James T (1999) Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Elie Tamer (2003) Incomplete bivariate discrete response model with multiple equilibria | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 58 scored citations.