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Evaluating AI Investment Strategies

Irene Aldridge

arXiv 7 Jun 2026 · Econometrics

arXiv:2606.08791 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text

Abstract

We study the problem of auditing a black-box algorithmic decision-maker from observable inputs and outputs alone. Our main result is an exact decomposition: under precisely characterized conditions, the cumulative regret of a dynamic policy equals the sum of per-period covariances between the cost vector and the policy's decision. This extends the single-period identity of Aldridge (2026) to the full multi-period setting of stochastic dynamic programming. We prove the identity holds exactly under i.i.d. costs and mean-unbiased Markov policies, derive closed-form bias corrections for non-stationary and time-varying cases, and establish the discounted-horizon analog. A Bellman recursion for the covariance regret functional connects the result to standard reinforcement learning algorithms; for rolling-window policies, the estimation-error bias is $O(d/w)$. The decomposition has direct implications for algorithmic auditing in strategic environments: in platform mechanism design, it provides a welfare-based audit metric without access to the agent's private type; in repeated games, covariance reduction is a sufficient condition for policy improvement; in procurement and ad auctions, the bias correction quantifies welfare loss from strategic misreporting. The associated trajectory estimator is consistent, asymptotically normal with HAC variance, and computable in $O(T \cdot nd)$ time. This makes the proposed approach a tractable, model-free audit tool for platform mechanisms, algorithmic portfolio strategies, and any sequential decision system subject to external performance review.

Citation extraction

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Most heavily cited references

The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.

ReferenceIntensityMentionsSectionsMain text
1Aldridge, Irene (2026) Regret Equals Covariance: A Closed-Form Characterization for Stochastic Optimization self0.92844100%
2Roll, Richard (1984) A Simple Implicit Measure of the Effective Bid-Ask Spread in an Efficient Market0.73732100%
3Edelman, Benjamin and Ostrovsky, Michael and Schwarz, Michael (2007) Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords0.64422100%
4Engle, Robert F (1982) Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation0.64422100%
5Hart, Sergiu and Mas-Colell, Andreu (2000) A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium0.64422100%
6Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Tirole, Jean (1993) A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation0.64422100%
7Ledoit, Olivier and Wolf, Michael (2004) A Well-Conditioned Estimator for Large-Dimensional Covariance Matrices0.64422100%
8Myerson, Roger B (1982) Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems0.64422100%
9Roughgarden, Tim (2016) Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory0.64422100%
10Varian, Hal R (2007) Position Auctions0.64422100%

Showing the top 10 of 52 scored citations.

Cited by, within the corpus

arXiv econ.EM papers that cite this one, ranked by how heavily they lean on it.

Citing paperIntensityMentionsSections
1AI Governance for Institutional Readiness in Finance0.40511