arXiv 6 Oct 2025 · Econometrics
arXiv:2510.04464 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
I establish nonparametric identification results in first- and second-price auctions when transaction prices are truncated by a binding reserve price under a range of information structures. When the number of potential bidders is fixed and known across all auctions, if only the transaction price is observed, the bidders' private-value distribution is identified in second-price auctions but not in first-price auctions. Identification in first-price auctions can be achieved if either the number of active bidders or the number of auctions with no sales is observed. When the number of potential bidders varies across auctions and is unknown, the bidders' private-value distribution is identified in first-price auctions but not in second-price auctions, provided that both the transaction price and the number of active bidders are observed. I derive analogous results to auctions with entry costs, which face a similar truncation issue when data on potential bidders who do not enter are missing.
appendix boundary found by none_found · 100% of the source is main text. Read the extracted text to check this.
The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Milgrom, P. R. and Weber, R. J (1982) A theory of auctions and competitive bidding | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 2 | Aradillas-López, A., Gandhi, A., and Quint, D (2013) Identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 3 | Athey, S. and Haile, P. A (2002) Identification of standard auction models | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 4 | Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q (2000) Optimal nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 5 | Riley, J. G. and Samuelson, W. F (1981) Optimal auctions | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 6 | Shneyerov, A. and Wong, A. C. L (2011) Identification in first-price and dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 7 | Adams, C. P (2007) Estimating demand from ebay prices | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 8 | An, Y., Hu, Y., and Shum, M (2010) Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: A misclassification approach | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 9 | Campo, S., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q (2003) Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 10 | Campo, S., Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q (2011) Semiparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 34 scored citations.