Pauline Corblet, Jeremy Fox, Alfred Galichon
arXiv 3 Oct 2025 · Econometrics
arXiv:2510.02737 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
We introduce a model of dynamic matching with transferable utility, extending the static model of Shapley and Shubik (1971). Forward-looking agents have individual states that evolve with current matches. Each period, a matching market with market-clearing prices takes place. We prove the existence of an equilibrium with time-varying distributions of agent types and show it is the solution to a social planner's problem. We also prove that a stationary equilibrium exists. We introduce econometric shocks to account for unobserved heterogeneity in match formation. We propose two algorithms to compute a stationary equilibrium. We adapt both algorithms for estimation. We estimate a model of accumulation of job-specific human capital using data on Swedish engineers.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Choo, E. and A. Siow (2006) Who Marries Whom and Why | 1.000 | 11 | 5 | 100% |
| 2 | Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1971) The Assignment Game I: The Core | 1.000 | 10 | 5 | 100% |
| 3 | Rust, J (1987) Optimal Replacement of GMC Bus Engines: An Empirical Model of Harold Zurcher | 1.000 | 7 | 3 | 100% |
| 4 | Chiappori, P.-A., B. Salanié, and Y. Weiss (2017) Partner Choice, Investment in Children, and the Marital College Premium | 0.928 | 4 | 3 | 100% |
| 5 | Romeijn, H. E. and R. L. Smith (1998) Shadow Prices in Infinite-Dimensional Linear Programming | 0.874 | 10 | 2 | 100% |
| 6 | Galichon, A. and B. Salanié (2022) Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models self | 0.874 | 5 | 2 | 100% |
| 7 | Chambolle, A. and T. Pock (2011) A First-Order Primal-Dual Algorithm for Convex Problems with Applications to Imaging | 0.811 | 4 | 2 | 100% |
| 8 | Becker, G. S (1973) A Theory of Marriage: Part I | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 9 | Fox, J. T (2018) Estimating Matching Games with Transfers self | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Dupuy, A. and A. Galichon (2014) Personality Traits and the Marriage Market | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 42 scored citations.
arXiv econ.EM papers that cite this one, ranked by how heavily they lean on it.
| Citing paper | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Can looser ties sustain marriage? A dynamic matching model of specialisation and divorce | 0.737 | 4 | 3 |