arXiv 28 Oct 2024 · Econometrics
arXiv:2410.20860 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
Many policy problems involve designing individualized treatment allocation rules to maximize the equilibrium social welfare of interacting agents. Focusing on large-scale simultaneous decision games with strategic complementarities, we develop a method to estimate an optimal treatment allocation rule that is robust to the presence of multiple equilibria. Our approach remains agnostic about changes in the equilibrium selection mechanism under counterfactual policies, and we provide a closed-form expression for the boundary of the set-identified equilibrium outcomes. To address the incompleteness that arises when an equilibrium selection mechanism is not specified, we use the maximin welfare criterion to select a policy, and implement this policy using a greedy algorithm. We establish a performance guarantee for our method by deriving a welfare regret bound, which accounts for sampling uncertainty and the use of the greedy algorithm. We demonstrate our method with an application to the microfinance dataset of Banerjee et al. (2013).
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Bajari, P., H. Hong, J. Krainer, and D. Nekipelov (2010) a): Estimating static models of strategic interactions | 1.000 | 8 | 3 | 100% |
| 2 | Leung, M. P (2015) Two-step estimation of network-formation models with incomplete information | 1.000 | 7 | 4 | 100% |
| 3 | Brock, W. A. and S. N. Durlauf (2001) Discrete choice with social interactions | 1.000 | 6 | 3 | 100% |
| 4 | Ridder, G. and S. Sheng (2020) Two-step estimation of a strategic network formation model with clustering | 1.000 | 5 | 3 | 100% |
| 5 | Tamer, E (2003) Incomplete simultaneous discrete response model with multiple equilibria | 1.000 | 5 | 3 | 100% |
| 6 | Banerjee, A., A. G. Chandrasekhar, E. Duflo, and M. O. Jackson (2013) The Diffusion of Microfinance | 0.961 | 9 | 4 | 89% |
| 7 | Chamberlain, G (2000) a): Econometric applications of maxmin expected utility | 0.928 | 4 | 3 | 100% |
| 8 | Galeotti, A., B. Golub, and S. Goyal (2020) Targeting interventions in networks | 0.928 | 4 | 3 | 100% |
| 9 | de Paula, A. and X. Tang (2012) Inference of signs of interaction effects in simultaneous games with incomplete information | 0.874 | 5 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Kitagawa, T. and G. Wang (2023) a): Individualized Treatment Allocation in Sequential Network Games | 0.874 | 5 | 2 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 121 scored citations.
arXiv econ.EM papers that cite this one, ranked by how heavily they lean on it.
| Citing paper | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Individualized Treatment Allocation in Sequential Network Games | 0.511 | 2 | 1 |