Yongchan Kwon, Sokbae Lee, Guillaume A. Pouliot
arXiv 9 Oct 2024 · Econometrics
arXiv:2410.06875 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
We propose a variant of the Shapley value, the group Shapley value, to interpret counterfactual simulations in structural economic models by quantifying the importance of different components. Our framework compares two sets of parameters, partitioned into multiple groups, and applying group Shapley value decomposition yields unique additive contributions to the changes between these sets. The relative contributions sum to one, enabling us to generate an importance table that is as easily interpretable as a regression table. The group Shapley value can be characterized as the solution to a constrained weighted least squares problem. Using this property, we develop robust decomposition methods to address scenarios where inputs for the group Shapley value are missing. We first apply our methodology to a simple Roy model and then illustrate its usefulness by revisiting two published papers.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Coşar, A. K., N. Guner, and J. Tybout (2016) Firm dynamics, job turnover, and wage distributions in an open economy | 1.000 | 7 | 3 | 100% |
| 2 | Lundberg, S. M. and S.-I. Lee (2017) A unified approach to interpreting model predictions | 1.000 | 6 | 4 | 100% |
| 3 | David, J. M. and V. Venkateswaran (2019) The sources of capital misallocation | 0.874 | 25 | 2 | 100% |
| 4 | Honoré, B. E. and L. Hu (2017) Poor (wo) man's bootstrap | 0.874 | 5 | 2 | 100% |
| 5 | Gul, F (1989) Bargaining foundations of Shapley value | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 6 | Charnes, A., B. Golany, M. Keane, and J. Rousseau (1988) Extremal principle solutions of games in characteristic function form: Core, Chebychev and Shapley value generalizations | 0.644 | 4 | 1 | 100% |
| 7 | Shapley, L. S (1953) A value for n-person games | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 8 | Aas, K., M. Jullum, and A. Lland (2021) Explaining individual predictions when features are dependent: More accurate approximations to Shapley values | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 9 | Moulin, H (2004) Fair division and collective welfare | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Owen, A. B (2014) Sobol' Indices and Shapley Value | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 25 scored citations.