Sen Li, Kameshwar Poolla, Pravin Varaiya
arXiv 5 Mar 2020 · Econometrics · publishedTransportation Research Part A Policy and Practice (2021) · 1 citations (OpenAlex)
arXiv:2003.02550 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
This paper describes the impact on transportation network companies (TNCs) of the imposition of a congestion charge and a driver minimum wage. The impact is assessed using a market equilibrium model to calculate the changes in the number of passenger trips and trip fare, number of drivers employed, the TNC platform profit, the number of TNC vehicles, and city revenue. Two charges are considered: (a) a charge per TNC trip similar to an excise tax, and (b) a charge per vehicle operating hour (whether or not it has a passenger) similar to a road tax. Both charges reduce the number of TNC trips, but this reduction is limited by the wage floor, and the number of TNC vehicles reduced is not significant. The time-based charge is preferable to the trip-based charge since, by penalizing idle vehicle time, the former increases vehicle occupancy. In a case study for San Francisco, the time-based charge is found to be Pareto superior to the trip-based charge as it yields higher passenger surplus, higher platform profits, and higher tax revenue for the city.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | S. Li, H. Tavafoghi, K. Poolla, and P. Varaiya (2019) Regulating TNCs: Should Uber and Lyft set their own rules? | 0.874 | 8 | 2 | 100% |
| 2 | New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission (2018) Notice of promulgation: Statement of basis and purpose of rules | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 3 | J. A. Parrott and M. Reich (2018) An earning standard for New York City app-based drivers: Economic analysis and policy assessment | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 4 | J. Castiglione, D. Cooper, B. Sana, D. Tischler, T. Chang, G. D. Erh… (2018) TNCs & Congestion. Draft Report | 0.511 | 2 | 2 | 50% |
| 5 | NYCTLC (2019) New York State's Congestion Surcharge | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 6 | SF SPUR (2019) SPUR voter guide, November 2019 | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 7 | S. Benjaafar, J. Ding, G. Kong, and T. Taylor (2018) Labor welfare in on-demand service platforms | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 8 | Keiko Budech (2019) The seattle fare share plan passes, November 2019 | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 9 | D. Vignon and Y. Yin (2020) Regulating ride-sourcing services with product differentiation and congestion externality | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 10 | J. Castiglione, T. Chang, D. Cooper, J. Hobson, W. Logan, E. Young,… (2017) TNCs today: a profile of San Francisco transportation network company activity. Final Report | 0.481 | 6 | 2 | 17% |
Showing the top 10 of 56 scored citations.