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Estimation of Auction Models with Shape Restrictions

Joris Pinkse, Karl Schurter

arXiv 16 Dec 2019 · Econometrics · 2 citations (OpenAlex)

arXiv:1912.07466 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text

Abstract

We introduce several new estimation methods that leverage shape constraints in auction models to estimate various objects of interest, including the distribution of a bidder's valuations, the bidder's ex ante expected surplus, and the seller's counterfactual revenue. The basic approach applies broadly in that (unlike most of the literature) it works for a wide range of auction formats and allows for asymmetric bidders. Though our approach is not restrictive, we focus our analysis on first--price, sealed--bid auctions with independent private valuations. We highlight two nonparametric estimation strategies, one based on a least squares criterion and the other on a maximum likelihood criterion. We also provide the first direct estimator of the strategy function. We establish several theoretical properties of our methods to guide empirical analysis and inference. In addition to providing the asymptotic distributions of our estimators, we identify ways in which methodological choices should be tailored to the objects of their interest. For objects like the bidders' ex ante surplus and the seller's counterfactual expected revenue with an additional symmetric bidder, we show that our input--parameter--free estimators achieve the semiparametric efficiency bound. For objects like the bidders' inverse strategy function, we provide an easily implementable boundary--corrected kernel smoothing and transformation method in order to ensure the squared error is integrable over the entire support of the valuations. An extensive simulation study illustrates our analytical results and demonstrates the respective advantages of our least--squares and maximum likelihood estimators in finite samples. Compared to estimation strategies based on kernel density estimation, the simulations indicate that the smoothed versions of our estimators enjoy a large degree of robustness to the choice of an input parameter.

Citation extraction

39
references
81
in-text mentions
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distinct cited
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Most heavily cited references

The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.

ReferenceIntensityMentionsSectionsMain text
1Luo, Y. and Wan, Y (2018) Integrated–quantile–based estimation for first–price auction models1.00083100%
2Guerre, E., Perrigne, I., and Vuong, Q (2000) Optimal Nonparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions0.92843100%
3Marmer, V. and Shneyerov, A (2012) Quantile–based nonparametric inference for first-price auctions0.92843100%
4Hickman, B. R. and Hubbard, T. P (2015) Replacing sample trimming with boundary correction in nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions0.87452100%
5Ma, J., Marmer, V., and Shneyerov, A (2019) Inference for first–price auctions with guerre, perrigne, and vuong's estimator0.81142100%
6Ma, J., Marmer, V., Shneyerov, A., and Xu, P (2019) Monotonicity–constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first–price auctions0.81142100%
7Larsen, B. and Zhang, A. L (2018) A mechanism design approach to identification and estimation0.73732100%
8Pinkse, J. and Schurter, K (2019) Improved bandwidth selection for boundary correction using the generalized reflection method self0.73732100%
9Milgrom, P. R. and Weber, R. J (1982) A theory of auctions and competitive bidding0.64422100%
10Gimenes, N. and Guerre, E (2019) Quantile regression methods for first–price auctions0.64422100%

Showing the top 10 of 39 scored citations.

Cited by, within the corpus

arXiv econ.EM papers that cite this one, ranked by how heavily they lean on it.

Citing paperIntensityMentionsSections
1A Projection Framework for Testing Shape Restrictions That Form Convex Cones0.51122
2Estimates of derivatives of (log) densities and related objects0.40511
3Nonparametric inference on counterfactuals in first-price auctions0.40511
4Grenander-type Density Estimation under Myerson Regularity0.40511