Jayeeta Bhattacharya, Nathalie Gimenes, Emmanuel Guerre
arXiv 29 Nov 2019 · Econometrics · publishedJournal of Business and Economic Statistics (2021) · 4 citations (OpenAlex)
arXiv:1911.13063 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
The paper proposes a parsimonious and flexible semiparametric quantile regression specification for asymmetric bidders within the independent private value framework. Asymmetry is parameterized using powers of a parent private value distribution, which is generated by a quantile regression specification. As noted in Cantillon (2008) , this covers and extends models used for efficient collusion, joint bidding and mergers among homogeneous bidders. The specification can be estimated for ascending auctions using the winning bids and the winner's identity. The estimation is in two stage. The asymmetry parameters are estimated from the winner's identity using a simple maximum likelihood procedure. The parent quantile regression specification can be estimated using simple modifications of Gimenes (2017). Specification testing procedures are also considered. A timber application reveals that weaker bidders have $30%$ less chances to win the auction than stronger ones. It is also found that increasing participation in an asymmetric ascending auction may not be as beneficial as using an optimal reserve price as would have been expected from a result of BulowKlemperer (1996) valid under symmetry.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Bulow and Klemperer (1996) Auctions versus negotiations, American Economic Review 86(1), 180–194 | 1.000 | 9 | 4 | 100% |
| 2 | Cantillon (2008) The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions, Games and Economic Behavior 62(1), 1–25 | 1.000 | 6 | 4 | 100% |
| 3 | Coey, Larsen, Sweeney and Waisman (2017) Ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries, Quantitative Economics 8(1), 181–200 | 1.000 | 6 | 3 | 100% |
| 4 | Flambard and Perrigne (2006) Asymmetry in procurement auctions: Evidence from snow removal contracts, The Economic Journal 116(514), 1014–1036 | 1.000 | 5 | 3 | 100% |
| 5 | Brendstrup and Paarsch (2006) Identification and estimation in sequential, asymmetric, english auctions, Journal of Econometrics 134(1), 69–94 | 0.928 | 5 | 3 | 80% |
| 6 | Gimenes (2017) Econometrics of ascending auctions by quantile regression, Review of Economics and Statistics 99(5), 944–953 self | 0.874 | 15 | 6 | 67% |
| 7 | Aradillas-López, Gandhi and Quint (2013) Identification and inference in ascending auctions with correlated private values, Econometrica 81(2), 489–534 | 0.843 | 4 | 4 | 75% |
| 8 | Rothe and Wied (2013) Misspecification testing in a class of conditional distributional models, Journal of the American Statistical Association 108(50… | 0.737 | 4 | 2 | 75% |
| 9 | Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011) Bid preference programs and participation in highway procurement auctions, American Economic Review 101(6), 2653–86 | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Marion (2007) Are bid preferences benign? the effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions, Journal of Public Economics… | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
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