Cristina Gualdani, Shruti Sinha
arXiv 11 Nov 2019 · Econometrics · publishedJournal of Econometrics (2024) · 8 citations (OpenAlex)
arXiv:1911.04529 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
We study identification of preferences in static single-agent discrete choice models where decision makers may be imperfectly informed about the state of the world. We leverage the notion of one-player Bayes Correlated Equilibrium by Bergemann and Morris (2016) to provide a tractable characterization of the sharp identified set. We develop a procedure to practically construct the sharp identified set following a sieve approach, and provide sharp bounds on counterfactual outcomes of interest. We use our methodology and data on the 2017 UK general election to estimate a spatial voting model under weak assumptions on agents' information about the returns to voting. Counterfactual exercises quantify the consequences of imperfect information on the well-being of voters and parties.
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arXiv econ.EM papers that cite this one, ranked by how heavily they lean on it.
| Citing paper | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Identification and Estimation of Dynamic Games with Unknown Information Structure | 1.000 | 7 | 3 |
| 2 | Testing Information Ordering for Strategic Agents | 0.405 | 1 | 1 |
| 3 | Revealed Information | 0.405 | 1 | 1 |