Rodrigo A. Velez, Alexander L. Brown
arXiv 21 Apr 2018 · Econometrics · 1 citations (OpenAlex)
arXiv:1804.07986 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
We study the foundations of empirical equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium that is based on a non-parametric characterization of empirical distributions of behavior in games (Velez and Brown,2020b arXiv:1907.12408). The refinement can be alternatively defined as those Nash equilibria that do not refute the regular QRE theory of Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2005). By contrast, some empirical equilibria may refute monotone additive randomly disturbed payoff models. As a by product, we show that empirical equilibrium does not coincide with refinements based on approximation by monotone additive randomly disturbed payoff models, and further our understanding of the empirical content of these models.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Goeree, J. K., Holt, C. A., Palfrey, T. R (2005) Regular quantal response equilibrium | 1.000 | 10 | 3 | 100% |
| 2 | McKelvey, R. D., Palfrey, T. R (1995) Quantal response equilibria for normal form games | 1.000 | 9 | 3 | 100% |
| 3 | Velez, R. A., Brown, A. L (2020) b self | 1.000 | 8 | 3 | 100% |
| 4 | Myerson, R. B., Jun (1978) Refinements of the nash equilibrium concept | 1.000 | 6 | 3 | 100% |
| 5 | Velez, R. A., Brown, A. L (2020) a self | 1.000 | 5 | 3 | 100% |
| 6 | van Damme, E (1991) Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria | 0.938 | 23 | 5 | 83% |
| 7 | McKelvey, R. D., Palfrey, T. R (1996) A statistcial theory of equilibrium in games | 0.874 | 7 | 2 | 100% |
| 8 | Harsanyi, J. C., Dec (1973) Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points | 0.822 | 6 | 2 | 83% |
| 9 | Govindan, S., Reny, P. J., Robson, A. J (2003) A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem | 0.811 | 4 | 2 | 100% |
| 10 | Haile, P. A., Hortaçsu, A., Kosenok, G (2008) On the empirical content of quantal response equilibrium | 0.737 | 3 | 2 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 22 scored citations.