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Characterizing Assumption of Rationality by Incomplete Information

Shuige Liu

arXiv 15 Jan 2018 · Econometrics

arXiv:1801.04714 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text

Abstract

We characterize common assumption of rationality of 2-person games within an incomplete information framework. We use the lexicographic model with incomplete information and show that a belief hierarchy expresses common assumption of rationality within a complete information framework if and only if there is a belief hierarchy within the corresponding incomplete information framework that expresses common full belief in caution, rationality, every good choice is supported, and prior belief in the original utility functions.

Citation extraction

15
references
29
in-text mentions
15
distinct cited
1
self-citations
8,645
main-text words

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Most heavily cited references

The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.

ReferenceIntensityMentionsSectionsMain text
1Liu, S (2017) Characterizing permissibility and proper rationalizability by incomplete information, working paper self1.00093100%
2Perea, A (2012) Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice0.92844100%
3Brandenburger, A., Friedenberge, A., Keisler, J (2008) Admissibility in games0.64422100%
4Perea, A., Roy, S (2017) A new epistemic characterization of $ $-proper rationalizability0.64422100%
5Brandenburger, A (1992) Lexicographic probabilities and iterated admissibility0.51121100%
6Asheim, G.B (2001) Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs0.40511100%
7Battigalli, P (2003) Rationalizability in infinite, dynamic games of incomplete information0.40511100%
8Blume, L., Brandenburger, A., Dekel, E (1991) Lexicographic probabilities and choice under uncertainty0.40511100%
9Börgers, T (1994) Weak dominance and approximate common knowledge0.40511100%
10Battigalli, P., Siniscalchi, M (2003) Rationalization and incomplete information0.40511100%

Showing the top 10 of 15 scored citations.