arXiv 6 Oct 2017 · Econometrics
arXiv:1710.02326 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
Gale, Kuhn and Tucker (1950) introduced two ways to reduce a zero-sum game by packaging some strategies with respect to a probability distribution on them. In terms of value, they gave conditions for a desirable reduction. We show that a probability distribution for a desirable reduction relies on optimal strategies in the original game. Also, we correct an improper example given by them to show that the reverse of a theorem does not hold.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Gale, D., Kuhn, H., and Tucker, A (1950) Reductions of Game Matrices | 1.000 | 6 | 3 | 100% |
| 2 | Mertens, J. F (1991) Stable Equilibria – A Reformulation | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 3 | Pearce, D (1984) Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
Showing the top 3 of 3 scored citations.