Manjesh K. Hanawal, Fehmina Malik, Yezekael Hayel
arXiv 27 Sep 2017 · Econometrics · publishedIEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (2020) · 1 citations (OpenAlex)
arXiv:1709.09334 · PDF · DOI · OpenAlex · Extracted main text
The ongoing net neutrality debate has generated a lot of heated discussions on whether or not monetary interactions should be regulated between content and access providers. Among the several topics discussed, `differential pricing' has recently received attention due to `zero-rating' platforms proposed by some service providers. In the differential pricing scheme, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) can exempt data access charges for on content from certain CPs (zero-rated) while no exemption is on content from other CPs. This allows the possibility for Content Providers (CPs) to make `sponsorship' agreements to zero-rate their content and attract more user traffic. In this paper, we study the effect of differential pricing on various players in the Internet. We first consider a model with a monopolistic ISP and multiple CPs where users select CPs based on the quality of service (QoS) and data access charges. We show that in a differential pricing regime 1) a CP offering low QoS can make have higher surplus than a CP offering better QoS through sponsorships. 2) Overall QoS (mean delay) for end users can degrade under differential pricing schemes. In the oligopolistic market with multiple ISPs, users tend to select the ISP with lowest ISP resulting in same type of conclusions as in the monopolistic market. We then study how differential pricing effects the revenue of ISPs.
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The works this paper leans on most, across its whole bibliography — not restricted to papers in our corpus. Ranked by composite intensity, which combines how often a work is mentioned, how many sections mention it, and how much of that falls in the main text rather than the appendix.
| Reference | Intensity | Mentions | Sections | Main text | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | X. Wang, R. Ma, and Y. Xu, "The Role of Data Cap in Optimal Two-Part… (2017) | 0.644 | 2 | 2 | 100% |
| 2 | Vishal Mishra, “Routing money, not packets," ACM Magazine, Communica… (2015) Pages 24-27 | 0.511 | 2 | 1 | 100% |
| 3 | E. Altman, J. Rojas, S. Wong, M. K. Hanawal, and Y. Xu, “Net neutral… (2011) self | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 4 | https://www.crcom.gov.co/pp/Zero$_$rating$_$eng.pdf | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 5 | S. Sen, C. Joe-wong, S. Ha, and M. Chiang, “A Survey of Smart Data P… (2013) | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 6 | http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/ (2016) /2016-192.pdf | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 7 | R. T. B. Ma, “Subsidization competition: Vitalizing the neutral inte… (2014) | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 8 | http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0217687enn.pdf | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 9 | M. Frank, and P. Wolfe, “An Algorithm for Quadratic Programming," Na… (1956) | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
| 10 | M. Andrews, U. Ozen, M. I. Reiman, and Q. Wang, “Economic models of… (2013) | 0.405 | 1 | 1 | 100% |
Showing the top 10 of 27 scored citations.